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FIRST-PERSONAL AUTHORITY AND THE NORMATIVITY OF 
RATIONALITY 
Christian Coons and David Faraci 
 
In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood sets himself the 
task of meeting “Broome’s Challenge”—a challenge to demonstrate that rationality is 
normative, in the sense that we have normative (or “objective”) reason in each and 
every case to meet its requirements.1 Southwood argues that success cannot be 
achieved by appealing to the normativity of other domains, such as prudence or 
morality. Rather, Southwood’s purported solution is to “explain the normativity or 
reason-giving force” of rationality by offering a theory that shows that rational 
requirements “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.”2 
Southwood’s proposal is that rational requirements are demands of one’s 
“first-personal standpoint”—what is good from one’s point of view3:  
It is commonly recognized that each of us has a particular first-
personal standpoint, a standpoint constructed out of our particular 
beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, goals, values, and so on, and relative to 
which things can go well or badly. Our standpoints describe what 
matters to us; they are ones in which we are invested.4 
 What are the demands of one’s standpoint? Southwood illustrates with the following 
examples:  
We are subject to a range of familiar standpoint-relative demands. 
Thus, given my intention to read the complete works of Dostoyevsky, 
I am subject to a standpoint-relative demand to make decisions that 
would help me realize this aim in light of my views about how best to 
do so. Given my views about the moral significance of poverty, I am 
subject to certain standpoint-relative demands concerning, say, how 
to decide to spend my income. Given my belief that humans evolved 
from apes, I am subject to a standpoint-relative demand not to believe 
that the Book of Genesis is literally true.5 
Notice that these demands resemble paradigmatic rational requirements. 
Respectively, they appear to be instances of the rational requirements: intend the 
                                                 
1 Nicholas Southwood, “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Ethics 119:1 (2008): 9-30. 
2 Ibid., 19. 
3 Ibid., 28. 
4 Ibid., 26, emphasis added. 
5 Ibid., 27. 
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perceived means to your ends; intend that which you believe you ought to do (enkrasia); 
and have consistent beliefs. Such demands are normative, says Southwood, because 
adhering to them “is a matter of honoring one's own first-personal authority.”6 It is 
partly constitutive of one’s having a standpoint that one see that standpoint as 
normative.  
Broome himself finds much of value in Southwood’s account: “I agree that we 
can consider most requirements of rationality as being relative to a standpoint.”7 And 
he agrees, further, that standpoints have first-personal authority: “We can consider 
the authority first-personal, since it comes from nowhere else but your own 
standpoint.”8 Broome’s primary reservation is merely that, while Southwood may be 
correct that standpoint-relative demands are requirements of rationality, and that 
rational requirements are thereby normative, this account fails to be sufficiently 
illuminating—it cannot explain the normativity in question: “There is no more 
substance to the claim that rational requirements are standpoint relative or reveal 
first-personal authority that [sic] appears in the specification of the requirements 
themselves. So this claim cannot explain why rationality is normative, if indeed it 
is.”9 
We argue that Southwood’s proposal fails on three counts: Southwood 
characterizes our standpoints as consisting in our “particular beliefs, desires, hopes, 
fears, goals, values, and so on” and as describing “what matters to us” or what is “good 
from [our] point[s] of view.”10 But there is tension in this model, because not all of 
the attitudes mentioned—specifically, many of our non-normative beliefs— really 
matter to us. If we maintain that our standpoints consist in the attitudes listed, then 
they do not have the normative authority both Southwood and Broome take them to 
have. We can, instead, understand our standpoints as consisting only in what matters 
to us; and the demands of our standpoints, so understood, may have normative 
authority. Yet this offers no help for Southwood, as these demands no longer 
resemble requirements of rationality and, in fact, may conflict with them. The 
demands of our first-personal standpoints may either be normative or resemble 
requirements of rationality, but not both.  
Second, Southwood runs headlong into the “bootstrapping” objection that 
helped illuminate the need to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the first 
place: attitudes for which we conceivably had no prior justification unacceptably 
provide justification for themselves and others. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 28. 
7 John Broome, “Reply to Southwood, Kearns and Star, and Cullity,” Ethics 119:1 (2008): 98. 
8 Ibid., 99. 
9 Ibid., 100. 
10 Southwood, 25. 
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Lastly, even barring our other concerns, the normativity of our first-personal 
standpoints is even more dubious than the normativity of rationality, and so the idea 
of grounding the latter on the former is cause for concern. What’s more, we argue 
that the only explanation on offer for why our standpoints are typically normative 
entails that the requirements of rationality, as understood by Southwood, are not 
normative in every case.  
 
* *  * 
 
Consider a variant of the classic gin/petrol case: Alan is sitting at a bar, after last call, 
with a full glass in front of him.11 He believes this glass to contain fine gin. Drinking 
fine gin is good from Alan’s point of view; it matters to him that he now drink a glass 
of fine gin, and he intends to do so. Rationality dictates that, absent a change in his 
antecedent attitudes, Alan ought to intend to drink the liquid in front of him.12 After 
all, he intends to drink fine gin now and believes drinking the liquid in front of him 
to be his only means to this end; and rationality requires that one take what one 
believes to be the necessary means to one’s ends. Southwood can accommodate this 
requirement: For him, both the intention to drink fine gin and the belief that the liquid 
in front of him is fine gin are parts of Alan’s standpoint. Alan is therefore subject to 
a standpoint-relative demand to drink the liquid in front of him. 
But (surprise!) the glass is not full of fine gin; it is full of petrol. Drinking 
petrol would kill Alan, and being dead is not valuable to Alan, in any sense. In fact, 
it is good from Alan’s point of view that he remain alive. If Alan has any normative 
reasons here, surely he has reason not to drink the liquid in front of him. Yet this is 
the opposite of what rationality demands of him.  
Is Alan really subject to a normative demand to drink the liquid in front of 
him—the liquid that is, in fact, petrol? One would think Southwood might reject this 
conclusion, asserting rather that there is, for Alan, merely a subjective demand—a 
perceived demand—to drink the liquid. Yet Southwood explicitly rejects this kind of 
response:  
. . . I regard the first-personal authority account as a kind of improved 
modification of the subjective reasons account. Both accounts regard 
rational requirements as claims about the attitudes we ought to have 
and form “from our own point of view.” The difference concerns the 
                                                 
11 See Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981): 102-103. 
12 We include “absent a change in his antecedent attitudes” in recognition of the possibility that 
this rational requirement has wide scope. In the next section, we argue that on Southwood’s 
model, this and many requirements of rationality have narrow scope. 
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interpretation of what this comes to. According to the subjective 
reasons account, this is interpreted in terms of the notion of subjective 
demands, whereas according to the first-personal authority account, 
it is interpreted in terms of the idea of standpoint-relative demands. 
Unlike subjective demands, standpoint-relative demands are genuine 
demands rather than merely believed or perceived demands.13  
There is something strange about this view, beyond its implication that Alan 
has an objective reason to do something that will, in fact, kill him. The notions of 
‘standpoint’ and ‘standpoint-relative demand’ are supposed to be natural. But there 
is nothing natural about supposing that it could ever be best, with respect to what 
matters to us, to drink petrol. Yet this is what Southwood’s view indicates. So what 
has gone wrong?  
It is not difficult to see the problem: There is a difference between that which 
is good from Alan’s point of view and what Alan believes would help realize these 
goods. The latter—such as Alan’s belief that there is fine gin in front of him—are not 
themselves good from his point of view, they are not part of what matters to him. 
Rather, such beliefs are Alan’s best guess as to what really would realize the good 
from his point of view. Honoring what matters to Alan does not involve his drinking 
perceived fine gin; it involves his drinking fine gin.  
In order for them to capture what really matters to us, then, we must 
understand our standpoints not to include many of our beliefs. We must exclude from 
Alan’s standpoint, for example, the belief that the glass in front of him is full of fine 
gin. Yet this revision offers no help for Southwood. The demands of our standpoints 
so understood no longer resemble requirements of rationality. What is advisable with 
respect to what matters to Alan is to do that which in fact realizes the good from his 
point of view. But failures to do what is advisable in this way are not failures of 
rationality. Surely, it would be advisable with respect to what is good from Alan’s 
point of view for him to be drinking at World of Gin (which serves the finest gin in 
town). Yet, given his belief that World of Gin is a gas station, Alan’s failure to do so 
is not a failure of rationality.  
 
* * * 
 
One might reply on Southwood’s behalf that rationality does not require that Alan 
intend to drink the liquid in front of him, but rather that he must either form this 
intention or revise one of his antecedent attitudes—either the intention to drink fine 
                                                 
13 Southwood, 29. For arguments in favor of the subjective reasons account, see Niko Kolodny, 
“Why Be Rational?” Mind 114 (2005): 509-563. 
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gin or his belief that the liquid is fine gin. According to this reply, the relevant 
requirement of rationality has wide scope.  
Indeed, Broome appears to read rational requirements, as understood by 
Southwood, as having wide scope:  
I agree that we can consider most requirements of rationality as being 
relative to a standpoint. For instance, take the requirement I call 
“enkrasia.” This is the requirement, roughly, that you intend to do 
what you believe you ought to do. Suppose you believe you ought to 
F. Rationality does not require you simply to intend to F. Instead, its 
requirement is in a particular way relative to your belief that you 
ought to F. It is conditional on this belief. More exactly, rationality 
requires of you the conditional proposition that you intend to F if you 
believe you ought to F. Your belief that F is part of your standpoint. 
So the requirement is relative to your standpoint in a particular way. 
Precisely what this relativity amounts to is specified in the conditional 
form of what is required.14 
On Broome’s reading, if one believes one ought to F, one acts enkratically 
either by intending to F or by ceasing to believe that one ought to F. This is not, 
however, the only way to understand this requirement. On a narrow-scope reading, 
one is required to intend to F given that one believes one ought to F. The requirement 
ranges only over the consequent of the conditional.  
Keep in mind that for Southwood rational requirements are the demands of 
one’s standpoint—demands whose authority stems from the need to honor that 
standpoint. As Broome acknowledges, your belief that you ought to F is part of your 
standpoint. It follows that unless your belief conflicts with other attitudes you have, 
it would be impossible for you to give up this belief without appealing to something 
external to your standpoint—in giving up your belief that you ought to F, you would 
fail to honor that standpoint. Therefore, on Southwood’s view, all else being equal, 
given that one believes one ought to F, one is required to intend to F. This requirement 
has narrow scope.  
Though not all requirements of rationality will turn out to have narrow scope 
for Southwood, many will. Take a general case, in which two mental states, A and B, 
conflict. Rational requirements are often seen as requirements of coherence amongst 
one’s mental states and so, as traditionally understood, rationality requires that one 
                                                 
14 Broome, “Reply,” 98. 
6 
 
not be in both states, A and B.15 But on Southwood’s view, if A is part of one’s 
standpoint, but B is not, then one is required to avoid B (and vice versa).16 
In fact, though Southwood claims to remain neutral between these 
interpretations, his examples all appear to have narrow scope.17 For instance, when 
Southwood says, “[g]iven my belief that humans evolved from apes, I am subject to 
a standpoint-relative demand not to believe that the Book of Genesis is literally true,” 
it seems clear he does not mean to leave open the option of revising his original belief. 
After all, all else being equal, such revision would be an affront to his standpoint.  
But most theorists, including Broome, find rational requirements’ being both 
normative and narrow-scope intolerable.18 Consider again Southwood’s belief 
concerning evolution. Any evidence Southwood has for his antecedent belief may 
likewise be evidence that the book of Genesis’ is not literally true. But, for all we 
know, Southwood has no prior justification whatsoever for this belief. He may have 
formed the belief, as it were, ex nihilo and given no thought to its merit, and yet the 
mere fact of the belief gives him normative reason to not believe in Genesis. Notice, 
further, that this requirement appears to be an instance of a more general 
requirement to believe the entailments of one’s beliefs. Thus, given that the 
proposition that humans evolved from apes entails itself, Southwood has normative 
reason to believe this, following directly from the fact that he already believes it—his 
attitude is self-justifying. Likewise, that Southwood adopts something as his end 
gives him normative reason to intend its means. And it is at least dubious that the 
mere fact that we adopt something as our end should provide us with any normative 
reasons at all.  
This is the problem of bootstrapping, and it is highly objectionable. What is 
more, it is one of the objections that generated renewed interest in the normativity 
of rationality—that has lead to the movement within the literature in which 
Southwood situates himself. Yet Southwood appears unable to avoid charges of 
bootstrapping himself.  
 
* * * 
                                                 
15 We talk about coherence amongst mental states rather than attitudes because sometimes 
failures of rationality involve failure to adopt an attitude, and thus there can be conflicts between 
two mental states, one of which is the lack of an attitude; such conflicts are not conflicts between 
attitudes. 
16 Alan’s requirement to drink the liquid in front of him—stemming from his fine-gin-drinking 
end and his belief that the glass is a glass of fine gin—matches this schema, and therefore, on 
Southwood’s view, also has narrow scope. 
17 Southwood, 11, n.5. 
18 See, for one, John Broome, “Normative Requirements,” Ratio 12 (1999): 398-419. See also 
Kolodny, “Why Be Rational?” 
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Even barring our concerns above, Southwood’s proposal cannot accomplish all that 
he hopes. His theory of rational requirements does not “explain their normativity or 
reason-giving force” by showing that they are “the kinds of thing that are, by their 
very nature, normative.” Claiming that our first-personal standpoints generate 
normative reasons is even more controversial than claiming that rational 
requirements do. After all, many deny that the bare fact that something matters to us 
justifies action. Instead, they argue, our standpoints provide us with normative 
reasons only insofar as our particular beliefs and evaluations reflect independent 
facts and values.19 
In trying to justify his claim that standpoint-relative demands are normative, 
Southwood offers only that to even qualify as possessing such a standpoint, one must 
see oneself as subject to its demands. And perhaps this is right. After all, when 
something matters to you or is something that you are “invested in,” perhaps you 
cannot help but treat it as normative—it seems impossible to get “reflective distance” 
from your standpoint.  
But for all Southwood has said here, he might well be defending the subjective 
reasons account—the view that the demands of rationality are always, but only, 
apparently normative. Though we may be unable to both possess a particular 
standpoint and question its normativity, we may yet ask: does the fact that something 
matters to me provide me with normative reasons?20 And many of us, especially were 
we to learn that our particular beliefs and evaluations were mistaken, would insist 
that the mere fact that these attitudes were our attitudes did not mean that they 
provided us with any normative reasons at all.  
Southwood owes us further justification for the controversial claim that our 
standpoints really do matter merely in virtue of their being our standpoints. There is 
a resource in the literature that intitally looks like it might help: the view that we 
merit a particular kind of respect. Consider the following, from Stephen Darwall:  
[R]espect for persons is a responsiveness to what makes them 
persons, the capacity for free agency. What we must attend to here is 
not, primarily anyway, what is for someone’s good, but what she 
holds good, and would want from her point of view . . . [T]reating 
                                                 
19 For a particularly perspicuous example, see Donald H. Regan, “The Value of Rational Nature,” 
Ethics 112:2, 2002: 267-291. 
20 For related discussion, see David Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come 
from What Is Constitutive of Action,” Philosophical Review 115:2 (2006): 169-198. 
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another’s point of view as normative is a form of respect. Taking a 
person’s welfare as normative is a form of care.21 
The lesson others extract from Darwall’s position is that our welfare matters 
only when and because we merit care.22 Analogously, one might conclude that our 
firstpersonal standpoints are normative only because we merit respect.23 This appears 
to be not only a way to explain the normativity of our standpoints; it appears 
necessary to any such explanation. One is hard-pressed to see why we would have 
any normative reason to “honor” our standpoints (qua our standpoints) if we did not 
merit respect.  
Even so, Southwood cannot use this resource. First, it seems to run contrary 
to his stated aim of showing that rational requirements are “by their very nature” 
normative, for if the normativity of our first-personal standpoints depends on our 
meriting respect, its normativity is conditional on our value. But much more 
importantly, if the normativity of rational requirements were grounded in a demand 
for self-respect, then there would be no normative reason to conform with rational 
requirements when doing so conflicts with self-respect. For example, if our ends 
involved ceding our agency to slavery or drug addiction, then there would be no 
normative reason to conform to the demand to take the perceived means to one’s 
ends.  
If Southwood, and apparently Broome, are right to claim that requirements 
of rationality are demands of our first-personal standpoints, and it is true that an 
appeal to self-respect is necessary to ground the normativity of those standpoints, it 
follows that it is impossible to meet Broome’s Challenge.24  
 
* * * 
 
Our attitudes can—and inevitably do—lead us astray. We fail to get what we want, 
what we value, what we hope for, because, despite our best efforts, we fail to 
                                                 
21 Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002): 14- 
15. 
22 See David Velleman, “A Right of Self-Termination?” Ethics 109:3 (1999): 606-620; Connie Rosati, 
“Darwall on Welfare and Rational Care,” Symposium on Stephen Darwall’s Welfare and Rational 
Care, Philosophical Studies 130 (2006): 619-635; and Christian Coons, “The value of individuals and 
the value of states of affairs,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Davis (2007). For a 
similar view, see Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995). 
23 For a similar point, see Velleman, “A Right to Self-Termination.” 
24 There is one possible out: One could claim instead that we have learned, surprisingly, that 
rationality requires us not to adopt ends that are incompatible with self-respect. Such 
requirements, however, would look suspiciously unlike traditional requirements of rationality. 
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recognize the true means to our ends. And even when we do not fail in this way, we 
may have no assurance that the desires, values and hopes we began with are 
themselves fitting. When we fail—either in achieving our ends or in adopting the 
right ones—we may not have failed rationally; in fact, we may have done everything 
rationality required of us. And so, many of our attitudes are not really good from our 
points of view. They are merely instruments—tools we use to get us where we think 
we are meant to go. These tools do not constitute what matters to us. They may have 
no inherent value, no normative authority. And the mere fact that we possess them 
does not always—or perhaps ever—justify anything.  
We have argued, for these reasons, that Southwood’s model fails to vindicate 
the normativity of rationality. There may be a way to explain, via our meriting 
respect, how elements of our standpoints become normative merely because they are 
ours. But even this will not vindicate the normativity of rationality in each and every 
case.  
Ultimately, Southwood may be seen as bolstering the subjective reasons 
account he takes his view to improve upon. Rationality appears normative because 
meeting the demands of our standpoint as modeled by Southwood—meeting the 
requirements of rationality—represents our best attempts at honoring what matters 
to us. 
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